Reducing CO2 emissions from residential energy use by Drummond, P & Ekins, P
 Reducing CO2 Emissions from Residential Energy Use 
 
Abstract 
 
To achieve EU GHG emissions of 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050, CO2 
emissions from residential energy consumption must be substantially reduced. 
Recognition of this has led to the introduction of a range of policy instruments at 
both EU and Member State level. This paper examines these policies, for the EU 
the UK, first by grouping them into three ‘pillars of policy’ – standards & 
engagement, markets & pricing, and strategic investment (each of which focus on 
different ‘domains of change’ embodying different economic processes) - and 
then by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each pillar in terms of 
instrument coverage and effectiveness. The paper finds strengths and 
weaknesses common to both UK and EU policy landscapes, including a 
comprehensive but broadly ineffective standards & engagement pillar of policy, 
and an ineffective markets & pricing landscape (including effective subsidisation 
of energy consumption in the UK, permitted by the EU), with poor coverage. The 
strategic investment landscape is found (until recently) to be substantially 
stronger in the UK compared to EU instruments and requirements. Priority 
reform actions are also proposed to address the weaknesses identified. The 
paper also offers discussion of recent policy developments in the UK. 
 
Keywords: Climate Policy, Energy Efficiency, Energy Policy, Policy Formation, 
Policy Measures 
 
 Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with CO2 emissions from energy use by the EU and UK 
residential sector1. This includes both regulated energy, defined as energy use by 
a building, including heating (space and water), ventilation and air conditioning 
(HVAC) and lighting), and non-regulated (household) energy, defined as energy 
use in a building, particularly by appliances and equipment bought by the 
occupier.  Direct CO2 emissions alone from the residential sector accounted for 
11% of total CO2 emissions from the EU28 in 2012 (EEA, 2015a), with upstream 
emissions associated with residential electricity consumption adding 
significantly to this. If the stated goal of a reduction in EU GHG emissions of 80-
95% below 1990 levels by 2050 is to be achieved (EC, 2011), the residential 
sector must therefore decarbonise very substantially over the coming decades. 
 
< Figure 1 - Actual and projected CO2 emissions from the residential sector 1990-
2050 - EU28> 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates historic residential CO2 emissions from the EU28, and 
projected requirements to 2050 based on the Commission’s Energy Roadmap 
2050 (‘Diversified Supply Technologies’ Scenario), which seeks to map out the 
contribution required by each sector if the overarching GHG targets, described 
above, are to be achieved (EC, 2011). This scenario envisages an 85% reduction 
in direct residential CO2 emissions from 1990 levels by 2050. Between 1990 and 
2010, such emissions reduced by an average of 1.8% annually. To achieve the 
2050 target, this value must increase to 4.4% from 2010 onwards2. To 
compound this already substantial challenge, the number of households is 
projected to increase by around 25% over this time (IEA, 2012).  
 
However, EEA (2015b) projects that direct CO2 emissions from buildings across 
the EU will reduce by an annual average of around 1.3% between 2010 and 2030 
under existing measures, and around 1.5% with the addition of ‘planned 
measures’. Whilst this projection pertains to all buildings, as the residential 
sector currently accounts for around 70% of direct emissions from all buildings 
(EEA, 2015a), it is reasonable to conclude that the rate for the residential sector 
only would not deviate substantially from this aggregate projection. In addition, 
EC (2011), along with much of the wider literature, foresee such decarbonisation 
to be achieved in large part through electrification of key energy services 
(particularly space heating). As such, it is important that CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation also decrease significantly over time (over 95% by 2050, 
from 1990 levels).  
 
 It is clear that an effective, well-coordinated and strengthened policy instrument 
mix must be in place, both at the EU level and within Member States, to drive 
such an ambitious transformation. This paper will first present, in Section 1, a 
conceptual framework regarding the three ‘domains of change’ and related 
‘pillars of policy’, developed by Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff (2014), that are 
required to deliver a low-carbon transition. Section 2 presents the methodology 
for the assessment undertaken in Sections 3 and 4, the latter of which maps the 
existing climate and energy policy instrument mix related to the residential 
building sector, first at the EU level, and then in a key Member State (the United 
Kingdom), onto this conceptual framework. Key strengths and weaknesses will 
be identified in each instrument mix against this framing, and suggestions for 
improvement put forward. Section 5 concludes. 
 
The Three Pillars of Policy 
 
The need for a combination of policy instruments in order to address the 
multiple market failures that lead to the excessive generation of environmental 
pollutants has long been recognised in the literature (e.g. Lipsey and Lancaster, 
1956). A number of different environmental policy instrument typologies have 
also been developed. For example, Jordan et al. (2003) group instruments under 
four generic headings: market/incentive-based (also called economic) 
instruments; classic regulation instruments; voluntary (also called negotiated) 
agreements; and information/education-based instruments. The policy 
instrument framework of OECD (2008) consists of direct environmental 
regulation, environmentally related taxes, tradable permits, public financial 
 support for environmental goods and services, instruments to promote 
technological development, and information-based and voluntary approaches.   
Wurzel, Zito and Jordan (2013, p.26) provide a recent overview of policy 
instrument typologies, from which it is clear that no single typology can be 
considered ‘correct’; the choice of which to use should depend on the purpose in 
hand. 
 
Regarding climate policy specifically, the landmark Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change considered that a policy framework for CO2 
abatement should have three elements: carbon pricing, technology policy and 
the removal of barriers to behaviour change (Stern, 2006). For the purposes of 
this paper, this is an attractive typology because each kind of instrument reflects 
a different kind of barrier to the efficient market implementation of energy 
efficiency and low-carbon measures: characteristics of human behaviour that do 
not accord with economic rationality, negative externalities from energy use that 
cause energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies and behaviours to be 
undervalued, and positive externalities from innovation that prevent new energy 
efficient and low-carbon technologies from being developed. Recently, Grubb et 
al. (2014) have developed the three-fold Stern categorisation into a new 
framework to identify and analyse the policy elements that are likely to be 
required to successfully achieve a low-carbon transition. This framework, 
adapted for use in this paper, is illustrated in Figure 2 
  
<Figure 2 - Three 'Domains of Change' and 'Pillars of Policy' (Adapted from Grubb 
et al., 2014)> 
 
Figure 2 shows three ‘domains of change’ and corresponding ‘pillars of policy’ for 
tackling CO2 (and other GHG) emissions. Each domain of change reflects a 
distinct sphere of economic decision-making and development. The first, 
‘satisficing’, draws on the insights from behavioural and organisational 
economics.  Evidence from these fields demonstrates that individuals (and 
organisations) are not always ‘rational optimisers’; they do not always respond 
to incentives to maximise their economic welfare over time. Four broad insights 
that produce this conclusion may be distilled. The first is that individuals are 
subject to ‘bounded rationality’, where decisions are constrained by cognitive 
processes and available information (which produces ‘satisficing’ behaviour, 
whereby individuals adopt behaviour that leads to outcomes that meet a 
threshold of satisfaction, rather than the economically optimal outcome) (Simon, 
1956). The second insight is that individuals tend to have hyperbolic discount 
 rates, meaning that individuals do not discount the value of future costs and 
benefits at a consistent rate of over time.  Such a discount rate is ‘present-biased’, 
meaning that the present value of long-term costs and benefits is much lower 
than the discount rate commonly used in economic models, which discounts 
future costs and benefits at a constant rate over time (Laibson, 1997). The third 
insight is that individuals tend to practice ‘mental (or psychological) accounting’, 
evaluating differently the utility received from different means of expenditure 
(e.g. via cash or credit card) (Morewedge, Holtzman and Epley, 2007). The fourth 
insight is that under uncertainty, individuals tend to rely for decision-making on 
heuristics, including ‘rules of thumb’, ‘anchoring’ (cognitive bias in future 
judgements based on the first piece of information provided), and the 
‘availability’ of information in terms of the ease with which it is recalled 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). 
 
The economically sub-optimal outcomes that result from these behavioural 
influences on decision-making may be addressed by policies that seek to produce 
‘smarter choices’, either as default (e.g. through minimum standards), or through 
encouraging positive active choices (e.g. through engagement, and the provision 
of information). Such instruments form the standards & engagement pillar of 
policy in Grubb et al.’s framework (Grubb et al, 2014). 
 
The second domain, ‘optimising’, draws upon the theories and assumptions of 
neoclassical and welfare economics. These schools of thought hold that 
individuals and organisations seek to maximise their welfare (utility) over time 
in response to economic incentives, with rational foresight and stable 
 preferences and technological options. Where markets are functioning perfectly, 
this results in an optimal ‘general equilibrium’ state for economic systems, in 
which private and social welfare is aligned and maximised from the most 
efficient use of a fixed set of resources.  However, it is acknowledged that private 
and social incentives and welfare may be misaligned, or resources used 
inefficiently, due to the presence of market (and institutional) failures. A key 
example is (positive and negative) market externalities, where the socialised 
economic cost (or benefit) of an action is not internalised (i.e. priced in) to the 
private cost (or benefit). In the context of this paper, the predominant example is 
the market externality of CO2 emissions. The economically sub-optimal outcomes 
that result from such situations  may be addressed by policies that alter the 
economic calculus of actors, particularly pricing instruments (e.g. carbon 
pricing), to make ‘cleaner products & processes’ the economically rational 
choice. Instruments that alter the structure of the market are also important. 
Together, these form the markets & pricing pillar of policy (Grubb et al, 2014). 
 
The third and final domain, ‘transformation’, draws upon the insights of 
evolutionary and institutional economics. The studies under these broad fields 
(and particularly the former) emphasise how technological and economic 
systems evolve over time, as a result of a dynamic interaction between historic 
developments, the direction of innovation, inherited infrastructure, and the 
nature of societal norms, values and institutions (Grubb et al, 2014; Norgaard, 
2010). Institutional economics, as its name suggests, focuses specifically on the 
role of institutions (‘including the state, political parties, courts, unions, firms, 
churches, and the like … [with their] rules, regulations, customs, common 
 practices and laws that regulate the actions of individuals and concerns’ 
(Rutherford 1983, p.723)), in setting the ‘rules of the game’, including long-term 
direction and expectations. Economic and technological systems exhibit ‘path 
dependency’ and ‘lock-in’ arising from earlier decision-making, particularly in 
terms of the nature and availability of infrastructure, which to some extent at 
least determine future possibilities (Grubb et al. 2014, p.312). Private 
investment is likely to be constrained according to this dependency and lock-in. 
Without change at the institutional level, particularly through interventions by 
the public sector, with its unique role in seeking to maximise societal welfare 
through policy, law and the use of public funds, will tend towards paradigmatic 
transitions (such as decarbonisation) are difficult or impossible to achieve. A 
‘strategic investment’ pillar of policy, which looks beyond short-term returns to 
invest in ways that support the evolution of more efficient and low-carbon 
technologies and systems (such as renewable energy), to produce appropriate 
‘innovation & infrastructure’, is therefore required. 
 
Each of the three domains and policy pillars, whilst presented as conceptually 
distinct, interact through numerous channels. As Figure 2 illustrates, whilst the 
impact is strongest in one, each of the pillars of policy have at least some 
influence on all three domains of change. Because household energy use exhibits 
characteristics of all domains, for an effective approach to decarbonisation 
policies from each of the three pillars need to be applied in a policy mix, which is 
an increasingly advocated approach to environmental policy more generally 
(OECD 2007). Grubb et al., 2014 consider all three domains, and by extension all 
 three pillars of policy, are of largely equal importance in delivering a low carbon 
energy system and economy (Grubb et al., 2014). 
 
Methodology 
 
Under the following two sections, Table 1 and Table 2 assign the key EU and UK-
level instruments in the climate and energy policy landscape, as related to the 
residential building sector, to each of the three pillars of policy in Grubb et al.’s 
(2014) categorisation (standards & engagement, markets & pricing and strategic 
investment). The instruments selected are all those that explicitly seek to impact 
residential energy consumption, CO2 emissions from residential energy 
consumption (including direct emissions from households, those from upstream 
electricity generation, and emission reduction through households’ own 
generation from renewables), and those that directly enable the control of 
energy use and CO2 emissions (e.g. requirements for the installation of smart 
meters). Requirements for the use of usually unspecified overarching strategies 
and plans, for example, are excluded from the analysis, as are instruments that 
support technological development but not deployment (e.g. funding for basic 
research). Table 1 and Table 2 also act as a ‘list of abbreviations’ for the text that 
follows. Whilst Table 2 also summarises the results of evaluations of the 
instruments listed for the UK, such information is not provided in Table 1 for the 
EU as comprehensive ex-post evaluations are not commonly available (and actual 
implementation for many instruments often varies substantially across Member 
States). 
 
 Each section proceeds to highlight the key strengths and weaknesses of the 
associated policy mix, based on an assessment of instrument coverage within 
each pillar of policy across sources of energy consumption and CO2 emissions, 
and the effectiveness of the instruments in each pillar in achieving their 
objectives (either stated targets, or in terms of their stated purpose or 
theoretical justification). Such an assessment is made based on a review of the 
scientific literature and official evaluation reports, and where such literature is 
not available, by recourse to theoretical considerations. In the absence of full 
evaluations, these assessments inevitably have a subjective element in their 
characterisation of ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’.  Each section then concludes 
with proposals for suggestions for priority reforms that may be introduced to 
correct the key weaknesses identified
 The Policy Landscape - European Union 
 
<Table 1 – Policy Landscapes across the ‘Three Pillars’ – European Union> 
Type and Name of 
Intervention 
Description of Intervention 
Standards & Engagement 
Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (EPBD) 
(2010/31/EC) 
- Member States must set cost-effective minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) (Article 4). 
- Any building sold or rented to a new tenant must be issues with an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC), illustrating 
energy performance data, reference values (such as minimum performance requirements), recommendations for cost-
effective improvement options, and information on where to find further information (Article 11). 
Energy Labelling Directive 
(ELD) 
(2010/30/EU) 
- Energy-using products and energy-related products (those which do not consume, but impact the consumption of energy) 
are subject to energy efficiency labelling. Products must be subject to a Delegated Act before they are covered by this 
Directive. 
Ecodesign Directive 
(2009/125/EC) 
- Energy-using products and energy-related products (described above) are subject to minimum environmental 
performance standards (usually related to in-use energy consumption). Products must be subject to an Implementing 
Measure before they are subject to this Directive. 
Energy Efficiency Directive 
(EED) 
(2012/27/EU) 
- Member States must introduce Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes (EEOS) for energy distributors and supplies to 
achieve annual savings of 1.5% total average energy sales by volume over 2009-2012, each year over the period 2014-2020 
(Article 7). 
- ‘Smart’ meters must be provided when a unit is replaced or a new connection is made, when technically feasible and cost-
effective (Article 9). 
- If consumers do not have smart meters, mandatory billing information must contain (a) data based on actual 
consumption and information, such as daily consumption profiles, be made available free of charge (Article 10), (b) 
comparisons with average or benchmarked consumption, and (c) details on where to receive information on energy 
efficiency. 
- Member States must implement programmes to raise awareness of the benefits and availability of energy audits amongst 
households (Article 8). 
- Other consumer information and empowerment programmes to promote energy efficiency amongst small energy 
consumers (including domestic consumers). This may include fiscal incentives and grants.  
- Qualification, accreditation and certification schemes must be provided to providers of energy services, audits and 
 installers of energy-efficiency elements, in Member States where technical competence, objectivity and reliability is 
insufficient (Article 16) 
- Information and training on energy efficiency mechanisms and financial and legal frameworks must also be provided to all 
relevant market actors (inc. consumers, builders, architects, auditors, etc.) (Article 17). 
Third Energy Package – 
Electricity 
(D2009/72/EC) 
- 80% of electricity consumers (across all sectors) must be fitted with smart meters by 2020 in each Member State, 
where cost-effectiveness is assessed positively (Annex I) 
Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED) 
(2009/28/EC) 
- The presence of renewable energy support schemes must be publicised through awareness raising and training, 
including to consumers, builders and architects (Article 14).  
- Qualification and certification schemes must be made available for installers of small-scale biomass boilers and stoves, 
solar photovoltaic and solar thermal systems, shallow geothermal systems and heat pumps (Article 14). 
Markets & Pricing 
EU ETS  
(2009/29/EC) 
- The EU ETS (EU Emissions Trading System) is a cap-and-trade instrument applicable to the power and heavy industry 
sectors. As a consequence, residential electricity consumption is subject to an upstream carbon price. 
Third Energy Package – 
Electricity 
(D2009/72/EC) 
- Electricity generators and suppliers must be ‘unbundled’ to produce a competitive electricity market price (Article 31). 
- Electricity wholesale and retail prices must be the product of market competition in all Member States (several 
Articles). 
Strategic Investment 
Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (EPBD) 
(2010/31/EC) 
- All new buildings must be classified as ‘nearly zero-energy buildings’ (NZEBs) by 2020, with any remaining energy 
requirements substantially satisfied by renewables (Article 9). 
Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED) 
(2009/28/EC) 
- Renewable energy support schemes must be introduced to meet Member State renewable energy targets for 2020. 
  
Key Strengths 
 
The focus of the existing instrument mix at the EU level is on the standards & 
engagement pillar of policy. Almost all such instruments focus on encouraging 
energy efficiency, directly or indirectly, rather than the reduction of CO2 
emissions per se. The regulatory push/pull effect (Rennings, 2000) is repeatedly 
employed, with minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) for new 
buildings and Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes (EEOS) for existing buildings 
providing a technology push towards higher efficiency in regulated energy 
consumption (through more efficient building envelopes and heating systems, 
for example), whilst the presence of Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) and 
Display Energy Certificates (DECs), by altering consumer preferences through 
increased awareness, engenders a market pull. The effectiveness of DECs in the 
UK could be strengthened by mandating their use in private as well as public 
buildings (Cohen and Bordass 2015). The Ecodesign and Energy Labelling 
Directives employ the same dynamic for energy-using and energy-related 
products (and thus, largely, non-regulated energy). Whilst these instruments 
seek to produce technological change, other instruments, such as the 
requirement for the installation of smart meters and the use of nudging 
information (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) on energy bills (through the provision of 
benchmarked consumption information), again employ push/pull dynamics to 
encourage reduced energy consumption through behavioural change. A further 
collection of instruments seeks to provide confidence in those supplying energy 
 efficiency and renewable technologies (and encourage high standards), through 
certification and accreditation mechanisms. 
 
A comprehensive set of standards & engagement instruments to encourage 
improved energy efficiency is the key strength of the existing instrument mix. A 
substantial energy efficiency gap, a term first coined by Hirst & Brown (1990), 
but more recently defined by Allcott & Greenstone (2012) as the ‘wedge between 
the cost-minimising level of energy efficiency and the level actually realised’, 
exists in the EU’s residential sector.  Wesselink, Harmsen and Eichhammer 
(2010) estimate the presence of around 80 Mtoe of cost-negative (final) energy 
efficiency measures available from the use of more efficient appliances and 
building envelope and system efficiency measures (including heating systems) in 
the EU residential sector by 2020. This equals around 27% of residential final 
energy consumption across the EU in 2010 (EC, 2011), the reduction of which 
would reduce both direct and indirect CO2 emissions (the extent to which 
depends on the specific measures introduced, the equipment replaced, and the 
fuel saved). The presence of information failures, split incentives (particularly 
the ‘landlord-tenant’ situation) and satisficing behaviour (discussed above) are 
all key explanatory factors as to why such unexploited savings opportunities 
exist (Grubb et al., 2014; Gillingham & Palmer, 2013; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994; Hirst 
& Brown, 1990). As illustrated in Figure 2, instruments under the standards & 
engagement pillar of policy are those most appropriate to reduce the impact of 
such issues.  The cost-negative nature of many of the actions these instruments 
induce or require makes them politically attractive, as evidenced by their strong 
 presence in the instrument mix, but actually realising the identified energy 
savings can be problematic in practice, as described below. 
 
Key Weaknesses 
 
Notwithstanding their theoretical appropriateness, the practical effectiveness of 
many of the instruments under the standards & engagement pillar is in many 
cases unclear. This is the first key weakness of the existing instrument mix. 
There are two principal reasons for this; the first of which is low quality or non-
implementation by Member States, and poor monitoring and enforcement. For 
example, MEPS for new buildings required under the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (EPBD) are often poorly enforced, with compliance often 
found to be relatively low across Member States (Pan & Garmston, 2012). At 
present, 17 Member States have, or plan to implement, an EEOS (often in 
combination with other instruments) to satisfy the requirements of Article 7 of 
the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED)3. However, of these instruments, 8 have 
major credibility issues, 6 have minor credibility issues, and only 2 have no 
issues4. Additionally, most monitoring, verification, control and compliance 
regimes have been judged to be inadequate (Rosenow et al., 2015). The second 
factor is that of initial instrument design. For example, whilst all Member States 
have a functioning EPC scheme (as also required under the EPBD), their design 
and structure differ somewhat (often resulting from a slow and partial 
implementation of the EPBD), producing different levels of clarity and 
effectiveness (Economidou et al., 2011). 
 
 Whilst labels required under the Energy Labelling Directive (ELD) are of a 
harmonised design across the EU, it is unlikely that this instrument had any 
significant impact on overall market sizes, structure or product choices amongst 
consumers for the products covered (Ecofys, 2014). Various factors have been 
identified as contributing to this. First, the introduction of A+ to A+++ labels 
appears to have produced confusion and a feeling of diminishing returns 
amongst consumers, reducing its efficacy compared to the simpler ‘A-G’ scale 
used in the first incarnation of the ELD in 1992 (London Economics & Ipsos, 
2014; Heinzle and Wüstenhagen, 2012). Secondly, around 90% of appliances 
covered by implementing measures fall into the ‘A’ category (Heinzle & 
Wüstenhagen, 2012), reducing the ability for consumers to differentiate between 
products. Thirdly, Waide & Watson (2013) found that although energy efficiency 
is commonly an important factor in purchase decisions for products with energy 
labels, factors such as capital cost often hold higher importance. 
 
This links to the second key weakness of the existing instrument mix. Even if 
instruments under the standards & engagement pillar are well designed, 
implemented and enforced, they may generally only be as effective as economic 
incentives permit them to be (even required MEPS are subject to cost efficiency 
clauses5). This requires the correct incentives to be delivered, primarily by 
instruments under the markets & pricing pillar of policy. 
 
As highlighted by Table 1, carbon pricing is only applied to electricity at the EU 
level via the EU ETS. Other (non-renewable) fuels used in households (such as 
gas, coal and oil), account for over 60% of energy consumption (and all direct net 
 CO2 emissions) from the residential sector6, mainly for space and water heating. 
These fuels may be exempt from any form of taxation under provisions of the 
Energy Taxation Directive (2003/96/EC) (except VAT, although this may be set 
at a reduced rate of 5%). As a result, markets & pricing instruments are largely 
absent at the EU level, with (CO2-intensive) energy consumption able to be 
effectively subsidised through a reduced-rate VAT (permitted by the VAT 
Directive), and a failure to internalise the market externality of CO2 emissions. As 
such, the incentives for private and socially optimal levels for the installation of 
energy efficiency measures, reduced demand through behaviour change and the 
installation of low-carbon heating and electricity generating technologies are 
misaligned. Additionally, despite legal obligations to the contrary, many Member 
States maintain regulated electricity prices (EC, 2014), preventing the full 
communication of the (albeit currently low) carbon price generated by the EU 
ETS. 
 
Instruments present under the strategic investment pillar of policy in Table 1 do 
relatively little to alter this picture. This is the third key weakness of the existing 
instrument mix. The Near-Zero Energy Buildings (NZEB) requirement for new 
buildings by 2020 is an extension of the existing MEPS requirement, but is 
included under the strategic investment pillar due to its apparently ambitious 
nature and the use of currently niche or immature technologies that would likely 
be required to achieve it. The EPBD allows Member States to set the definition of 
‘nearly-zero’, with many setting such definitions at 45-50 kWh/m2/year for 
residential properties (with some Member States yet to set a definition at all 
(BPIE, 2015)). Additionally, few Member States require any proportion of the 
 remaining energy consumption to be satisfied by renewables, as required by the 
EPBD (Ecofys, 2014a). In 2012, the average energy intensity of the existing EU 
residential stock was 185 kWh/m2 (Gynther, Lapillionne and Pollier, 2015). As 
such, it appears that in practice, NZEB requirements are not as ambitious as the 
name may at first suggest (indeed, Ecofys (2012) suggest that at 2010 energy 
and technology prices a cost-effective level of energy consumption is 15 kWh/m2 
or lower in four of five climatic zones across the EU, with <25 kWh/m2 
recommended for the coldest climatic zone (which includes Stockholm, Helsinki 
and Riga)). This is particularly the case if enforcement issues associated with 
existing MEPS continue. 
 
27 of 28 EU Member States provide financial support for renewable electricity 
for residential or community-level installations, for a range of technologies 
(commonly via feed-in tariffs, or increasingly feed-in premiums)7. 23 of 28 also 
provide some form of support mechanism for renewable heating sources and 
technologies. However, many of these renewable heating support schemes either 
do not apply to household or community-level installations (or only indirectly, 
such as support for the production of biogas in agriculture to feed in to the gas 
grid), or support some technologies but not others (e.g. biomass but not solar 
thermal), or are relatively weak, for example only offering loans or exemptions 
from other instruments (e.g. CO2 taxation), rather than direct financial subsidy. 
 
As such, the focus of the strategic investment pillar of policy at EU level is largely 
limited in practice to the energy efficiency of new buildings (although with 
relatively low practical ambition), and the deployment of renewable electricity 
 generation. The requirement for an EEOS under the EED is considered a 
standards & engagement instrument rather than strategic investment, due to the 
relatively low level of energy savings targeted, the flexibility in defining the 
target at Member State level, and the presence of alternative compliance 
mechanisms3. 
 
In summary, the existing EU policy mix places a substantial focus on encouraging 
short-term uptake of energy efficiency measures that are already cost-efficient at 
prevailing (albeit effectively subsidised in many Member States) energy prices. 
However, various design and implementation issues hamper this objective. 
Additionally, whilst important, considerably more must be done to move beyond 
this goal if emissions targets are to be met. Most significantly, medium- and long-
term requirements and incentives to meaningfully reduce demand for and 
decarbonise space and water heating in existing properties are either absent or 
insubstantial. This is by far the largest source of energy demand and CO2 
emissions from the residential building sector, and without attention in the short 
term to prevent continued high-energy and high-carbon lock-in, achieving the 
CO2 abatement trajectory illustrated in Figure 1 may become impossible in 
practice. 
 
Suggested Priority Reforms 
 
To provide both long- and short-term requirements and incentives for reducing 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions from the residential sector, the existing 
EU policy mix must be strengthened and rebalanced across all three pillars of 
 policy. The key weaknesses of the EU-level policy mix highlighted above suggest 
seven priority actions that may begin to achieve this: 
 
- Ensure adequate enforcement and encourage high-quality 
implementation of existing and future Directives and provisions (within 
constraints of the subsidiarity principle). This is a key weakness in the 
existing mix, under the standards & engagement pillar in particular. Without 
enforcement, little benefit derives from extending or strengthening existing 
requirements. High-quality implementation may be encouraged both by 
specifying a small number of acceptable compliance mechanisms, and by the 
dissemination of best-practice approaches. 
- Redesign key ‘engagement’ instruments to increase their potential 
effectiveness. For example, the ELD may be revised to re-specify the A-G 
ratings, and ensure an even distribution of products across categories. In July 
2015, the Commission released a proposal to do just this (EC, 2015). 
Standardisation or dissemination of best practice for other such instruments, 
such as EPCs, would also likely be beneficial. 
- The role of the markets & pricing pillar of policy should be extended by 
introducing carbon pricing to heating fuels and reducing market 
distortions, to broaden the use of carbon pricing beyond electricity and to 
reduce the implicit subsidisation of fossil fuels and energy consumption.  The 
former may be achieved through various means, such as a revision of the 
Energy Taxation Directive, or the expansion of the EU ETS (applied 
upstream). The latter would include ensuring regulated electricity prices are 
 removed (as per current requirements), and the removal of the ability for 
Member States to impose reduced rate VAT. 
- The role of the strategic investment pillar of policy should also be 
substantially expanded beyond (relatively low ambition) standards for new 
buildings (which are likely to account for a minority of the total residential 
building stock by 20508). Three key actions may be taken to achieve this. The 
first is to reform NZEB requirements from ‘nearly-zero energy’ to ‘net-
zero energy’.  This would increase ambition against current requirements, 
and may reduce flexibility surrounding the regulatory limits that may be set 
by Member States (i.e. interpretations of the meaning of ‘nearly-zero’, which 
currently allow for requirements that are significantly less ambitious than 
the literature suggests would be most cost-effective). 
- The second action to expand the role of the strategic investment pillar of 
policy is to extend EEOS requirements beyond 2020, and introduce 
mechanisms to encourage deep retrofits (for example, through a mandatory 
proportion of total compliance requirements, or through a compliance ‘uplift 
factor’). An explicit focus on residential buildings and a restriction on the 
ability to use alternative compliance mechanisms, as discussed above, may 
also prove beneficial. 
- The third action to expand the role of the strategic investment pillar of policy 
is to require or more directly encourage support mechanisms for 
residential renewable heating. Alongside expanded EEOS requirements, 
this encourages the installation of renewable heating technologies in existing 
buildings, individually or as district heating, which as discussed above, is a 
significant shortcoming of the existing policy mix, particularly since heating 
 accounts for the vast majority of the non-electric energy consumption in 
residential properties. 
 
The likely impact of such actions depend substantially on the specific design such 
instruments take, and the specific implementation in individual Member States, 
and as such should be assessed in future work. Regardless, it is likely that such 
actions alone would not be sufficient to achieve the rates of decarbonisation 
identified in Section 1. Beyond the policy instrument landscape as defined here, 
appropriate long-term planning and governance infrastructures will also be 
required. However, such aspects are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The Policy Landscape - United Kingdom 
 
This section describes the experience of the UK since 1997 9  in its 
implementation of measures to improve the energy efficiency and reduce (direct 
and indirect) CO2 emissions from the residential sector. Many of the instruments 
introduced were in response to EU legislation, described in the previous section, 
and therefore illustrate how one Member State sought to transpose such 
legislation into national policy.  Other instruments precede such requirements 
(for example, the UK energy efficiency obligations), and may even have led to, the 
EU legislative provisions described above. The UK is taken as an example 
because of its strong national legislation on climate change with ambitious 
emission reduction targets. Other Member States will, of course, have responded 
differently to the EU legislation described above. 
 
  
<Table 2 – Policy Landscapes across the ‘Three Pillars’ – United Kingdom> 
 
Type and 
Name of 
Intervention 
Description of Intervention 
Effectiveness Evaluation 
Energy/Carbon saved; Cost 
savings; Renewable power 
Standards & Engagement 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Standards of 
Performance 
(EESoP) 
EESoP ran in three phases from 
1994-2002, and led to the 
principle of energy suppliers 
being obligated to help their 
customers save energy through 
energy efficiency measures 
being incorporated in UK law 
through the Utilities Act (2000). 
The main measures delivered 
were insulation, lighting, 
heating and appliances. 
The National Audit Office in 1998 
calculated that the overall net 
financial benefit of EESoP1 
(1994-98) was £250 million 
(Ofgem and Energy Saving Trust, 
2003). 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Commitment 
(EEC) 
EEC, a supplier obligation that 
built on the experience of 
EESoP, was implemented in two 
phases. EEC1 ran from 2002-05 
and EEC2 from 2005-08, with 
‘lifetime’ energy savings targets 
of 62TWh and 130TWh, and 
projected costs of £500m and 
£1.2 billion, respectively 
(Rosenow, 2012). 
Estimated energy savings from 
EEC1 were substantially in excess 
of its targets, and were delivered 
for electricity and gas at a cost of 
1.3p/kWh and 0.5p/kWh 
respectively, far less than the 
retail price (Lees, 2006, p.6). 
The targets of EEC2 were also 
substantially exceeded, with 
EEC1 and EEC2 together 
estimated to be saving by 2010 
6.1 and 7.4 TWh of electricity and 
natural gas, with the EEC2 cost 
being 2.1p/kWh and 0.6p/kWh, 
respectively – less than a quarter 
of the average price to consumers 
of those fuels in EEC2. The life 
time carbon dioxide savings from 
meeting the EEC2 target were 
estimated as 59 mtCO2, yielding a 
Net Present Value of £53/tCO2 
saved (Lees, 2008, p.6). 
Carbon 
Emissions 
Reduction 
Target (CERT) 
and 
Community 
Energy Saving 
Programme 
(CESP) 
The target for CERT, introduced 
in 2008, was lifetime carbon 
savings of 293 mtCO2, estimated 
to amount to 104TWh of 
energy. The estimated cost over 
2008-12 was £5.5 billion 
(Ofgem, 2015a) This implies a 
cost of carbon saving of 
£18.8/tCO2.  The lifetime CO2 
savings target for CESP was set 
at 19.25 mtCO2, at an estimated 
cost of £332 million (Martin, de 
CERT carbon savings were 
estimated as 296.9 mtCO2, 101% 
of the target. For CESP the 
estimated delivery against the 
target was 16.31 mtCO2, or 84.7% 
of the target. CERT savings were 
delivered at an estimated cost of 
£3.65 billion, well below the ex 
ante estimation. The cost of 
carbon savings was estimated at 
£13.79/tCO2, also well below the 
ex ante estimation. In contrast, 
 Preux, and Wagner, 2011). the cost of CESP was estimated at 
£702 million, more than twice the 
ex ante estimation, while carbon 
savings of 20.2 mtCO2 just 
exceeded the target, implying a 
cost of carbon saving of 
£34.8/tCO2 (Ipsos Mori et al, 
2014). 
Energy 
Companies 
Obligation 
(ECO, ECO2) 
Following on from CERT, ECO, 
running from 2013-15, required 
obligated suppliers to achieve 
carbon and cost savings in 
respect of three distinct 
obligations: the carbon 
emissions reduction obligation 
(CERO), which promotes the 
installation of solid wall and 
hard-to-treat cavity wall 
insulation; the carbon saving 
community obligation (CSCO), 
which promotes the installation 
of insulating measures and 
connections to district heating 
systems in areas of low income 
and rural areas; and the home 
heating cost reduction 
obligation (HHCRO, which 
promotes the installation of 
measures, including the repair 
and replacement of boilers, to 
homes in receipt of certain 
benefits, to reduce the overall 
cost of space heating). ECO2, 
with the same obligations, was 
introduced to run from 2015-
17. Targets under the different 
obligations for ECO and ECO2 
were, respectively: 
CERO 20.9 (later reduced to 
14.0), and 12.4 mtCO2; 
CSCO 6.8 and 6.0 mtCO2; HHCRO 
£4.2 and £3.7 billion. (Ofgem, 
2012; Ofgem, 2015). 
The monthly ECO Compliance 
Update for April 2015 produced 
by Ofgem showed that the targets 
to the end of March 2015 had 
been over-achieved, with the 
exception of the HHCRO rural 
sub-obligation, which had 
achieved a 99% compliance, but 
with many measures in the 
pipeline (Ogem, 2015) 
Green Deal 
The Green Deal policy was 
enabled through the Energy Act 
2011. Its main novel provisions 
were the ability of a 
householder to take out a loan 
for energy efficiency measures 
which was repaid through the 
energy bill of that property, 
even if the householder moved, 
when the repayments would 
The Green Deal achieved far less 
take up than had been hoped – 
only 15,000 by 2015. In July 2015 
the new Conservative UK 
Government announced that it 
would not continue funding the 
Green Deal through the Green 
Deal Finance Company that had 
been set up for this purpose. 
While in principle Green Deals 
 continue for the new 
householder in the property. 
The measures needed to be 
those recommended and 
installed by individuals and 
companies with appropriate 
certification, and only those 
measures would be 
recommended which were 
calculated to pay back their cost 
within their lifetime – the 
‘Golden Rule’ (DECC, 2010). 
could continue to be financed 
privately, the announcement was 
widely interpreted as amounting 
to the end of the policy. 
Markets & Pricing 
Climate Change 
Levy (CCL) 
The CCL was introduced in 
2001 as a combined carbon-
energy tax on business. Energy 
intensive firms were largely 
exempted provided they signed 
up to Climate Change 
Agreements (CCAs). The 
exemption for renewables was 
ended in 2015, making the CCL 
almost wholly an energy tax. 
The UK National Audit Office 
evaluation in 2007 agreed with 
“the most recent estimate of 
annual savings of 3.5 MtC in 
2010” from the CCL, and 1.9 MtC 
from the CCAs (NAO, 2007). 
A different 2011 evaluation found 
that the CCL “caused plants 
paying the full rate to reduce CO2 
emissions by between 9.6% and 
22.6% compared to plants 
[covered by the CCAs] that paid 
the reduced rate.” (Martin et al, 
2011, p.28). No evidence was 
found that the CCL had adversely 
affected the competitiveness of 
UK manufacturing. 
Carbon Price 
Floor 
(CPF)/Carbon 
Support Price 
(CSP) 
The CPF was introduced in 
2011 and was intended to 
provide a minimum price for 
carbon in the power sector, 
rising from £16/tCO2 in 2013. It 
consists of the EU ETS 
allowance price, plus the CSP, 
which is calculated two years in 
advance and levied on the fossil 
fuel inputs to power generation, 
to deliver the projected 
minimum price, originally 
intended to be £30/tCO2 in 
2020, and £70/tCO2 in 2030. 
Because of the weakness of the 
EU ETS price, the CPS was 
frozen at £18/tCO2 in 2014. 
No evaluation yet available, but 
the government estimated in its 
impact assessment that the CSP 
would cumulatively reduce 
emissions by 261mtCO2 over 
2013-30 (HM Treasury & HM 
Revenue and Customs, 2010, 
pg.13). 
Strategic Investment 
Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation 
(NFFO) 
NFFO was introduced in 
England and Wales through the 
1989 Electricity Act (with 
similar legislation being 
introduced in Scotland and 
The total NFFO renewable 
generation target was 1500 MW, 
but by 2003 only 1098MW had 
been built (Tovey, n.d), with 
many contracted projects not 
 Northern Ireland). The Act 
allowed the government to 
require public electricity 
suppliers (PES) to purchase a 
certain amount of electricity 
produced from non-fossil fuels, 
and levied a charge on 
consumers, the Fossil Fuel Levy 
(FFL), to compensate the PES 
for the NFFO. Most of the 
revenues from the FFL went to 
the subsidise the nuclear 
industry, but NFFO itself 
supported renewables through 
five orders, the first in 1990, the 
fifth in 1998, paving the way for 
the introduction of the more 
ambitious Renewables 
Obligation in 2002. 
proceeding to construction. The 
NFFO installations generated 
around 3% of 2003 total UK 
electricity (around 380TWh). 
Renewables 
Obligation (RO) 
The Renewables Obligation 
came into force in 2002 in 
England, Wales and Scotland, 
and 2005 in Northern Ireland. It 
places an obligation on the main 
electricity suppliers to source 
an increasing proportion of 
their generation from 
renewable sources. The 
obligation is met by presenting 
Renewables Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs) at the end of 
year, or paying a ‘buy out price’ 
per MWh of shortfall in 
renewables supply. The RO is 
due to terminate in 2017, to be 
replaced for the CfD. 
Renewable electricity generation 
increased from less than 3% of 
total generation in 2000 to 
around 19% of generation in 
2014 (DECC, 2015a). Pursuant to 
its manifesto commitment, the 
new Conservative UK 
Government announced in July 
2015 that it was closing the RO 
for new onshore wind in 2016. It 
also announced that, in order to 
reduce subsidy costs, it was 
limiting the eligibility of biomass 
plants that were converting from 
fossil fuels. 
Contracts for 
Difference (CfD, 
a premium FiT) 
Contracts for Difference (CfD) 
were introduced as part of the 
Electricity Market Reform in the 
UK Energy Act 2013. They 
comprise a payment to 
generators of the difference 
between the average wholesale 
price or electricity and a 
(higher) technology-specific 
‘strike price’, to apply to low-
carbon technologies 
(renewables, nuclear and 
carbon capture and storage). 
CfDs will replace the RO from 
April 2017. 
The first CfD auctions, in 
February 2015, awarded 
contracts to 27 projects (onshore 
and offshore wind, advanced 
conversion, solar PV and energy 
from waste with CHP), with a 
total capacity of 2.1GW and an 
estimated subsidy of £315 million 
per annum by 2020/21. The 
strike prices were substantially 
below those anticipated in 
advance (e.g. £115-120/MWh for 
offshore wind, as against 
£140/MWh)  
Feed-in-Tariffs 
(FiT) 
While the RO and CfDs are 
intended to support larger-scale 
By the end of 2014 FiTs had led to 
the accreditation of 3.25GW 
 renewables, FiTs, first 
introduced in the UK in 2010, 
apply to smaller projects  for 
solar PV, wind, hydro, domestic 
CHP and anaerobic digestion. 
renewables capacity, 83% of 
which was solar PV (DECC, 
2015a). The tariff rate has been 
repeatedly reduced (e.g. for solar 
PV <4kW from over 40p/kWh in 
2010 to around 13p/kWh in 
October 2015) (Ofgem, 2015b). 
Renewable 
Heat Incentive 
(RHI) 
The RHI applies to both non-
domestic and domestic 
installations of eligible 
renewable heat technologies 
(including solid biomass, heat 
pumps, geothermal, solar 
thermal. biogas combustion 
and biomethane injection), 
with the former introduced in 
2011 and the latter in 2014. 
By mid-2015 1GW of renewable 
heat had been installed under the 
non-domestic scheme, nearly 
99% of which was solid biomass 
(Ofgem, 2014b). In the first six 
months of its operation (by 
Ocober 2014), there were 10,000 
domestic RHI accreditations 
(Ofgem, 2014a). 
Zero Carbon 
Homes (ZCH) 
The ZCH policy, introduced in 
2006, required all new homes 
from 2016 to avoid or mitigate 
all regulated emissions using a 
combination of on-site energy 
efficiency measures (such as 
insulation and low energy 
heating systems), on-site zero 
carbon technologies (such as 
solar panels) and off-site 
measures to deal with any 
remaining emissions.  
In July 2015 the new 
Conservative UK Government 
announced that it did not intend 
to proceed with the ‘zero 
carbon’ carbon offsetting scheme, 
or the proposed 2016 increase in 
on-site energy efficiency 
standards, but would keep energy 
efficiency standards under 
review. It is not clear what the 
implications of this are for the 
NZEB requirements for the 
European EPBD. 
 
 
Table 2 lists the various instruments introduced in the UK to promote the 
decarbonisation and more efficient use of residential energy, with two pre-1997 
instruments (Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance [EESOP] and the Non-
Fossil Fuel Obligation [NFFO]) listed as important precursors of subsequent 
instruments. 
 
Key Strengths 
  
<Figure 3 - Indices of GDP, household energy use and CO2 emissions, 1990-2013 
(1990=100)>10 
 
Figure 3 shows that UK residential energy use has fallen consistently since 2005, 
despite periods of strong economic growth, showing a clear departure from the 
energy-economy coupling of the 1990s. By 2013, although total residential 
energy use was 9% above that in 1990, energy use per household was 8% lower, 
and 35% lower per unit of disposable income11. Figure 3 also presents the 
evolution of CO2 emissions arising from this energy use. Two-thirds of 
residential energy consumption in the UK is fossil fuel (primarily natural gas) 
combustion for space and water heating12. Therefore, both direct and total CO2 
emissions track energy use trends closely. The divergence in total emissions is 
due to the decarbonisation of UK electricity from around 740 gCO2/kWh in 1990 
to 459 gCO2/kWh in 201313. Despite the decrease over time, total direct CO2 
emissions from the UK’s residential sector was second only to Germany in 2012, 
and the fourth highest in proportion to total domestic CO2 emissions14. The UK 
 must therefore continue to drive substantial reductions over time, driven by an 
appropriate policy framework. 
 
There is as yet no convincing evidence to attribute specific CO2 emission 
reductions to specific policy instruments and other (non-policy) influences, but it 
is likely that both aspects have contributed to the trends illustrated in Figure 3. 
However, in the 1990s the major cause of the reduction in total residential CO2 
emissions was undoubtedly the substitution of gas for coal in power generation 
(driven by market forces in the newly-privatised sector, rather than policy 
drivers), producing the reduction in CO2 intensity described above. A reverse in 
this trend and the 2009-2011 recession contributed substantially to the volatile 
trend experienced in 2008-12. However, it is clear that a comprehensive 
strategic investment pillar of policy had an effect. This is the first key strength of 
the UK’s policy mix. 
 
The Renewables Obligation (RO), and, most recently, a premium Feed-in-Tariff 
(FiT) called Contracts for Difference (CfD), are the UK’s main strategic 
investment instruments for incentivising the deployment of large-scale low-
carbon power generation, with a fixed-rate FiT encouraging mainly smaller-scale 
low-carbon power generation. As noted in Table 2, the RO required an increasing 
proportion of power generation to come from renewables, with penalties paid 
for a shortfall, while CfD operates through a guaranteed ‘strike price’ to come 
from the wholesale power market supplemented by a levy on consumers. The 
FiT provides both a generation tariff (differentiated by technology and 
installation size), and an export tariff (equalised across all installations). Figure 4 
 shows the evolution of the UK electricity mix from 2005-14, and the uptake by 
households of the FiTs for solar PV since their introduction in 2010. It can be 
seen that both the RO (for large-scale renewables) and FiTs have been highly 
successful in incentivising the deployment of renewable electricity capacity 
(such data is as yet unavailable for the CfDs), which in turn will have contributed 
to the reduction in CO2 intensity of power generation (and subsequent 
residential CO2 emissions from associated electricity consumption) shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
<Figure 4 - UK Electricity Generation Sources and Residential Solar PV 
Capacity>15 
 
These instruments are in place to meet the requirements of the EU Renewable 
Energy Directive (and the preceding 2001 Renewable Electricity Directive), as 
described in the previous section16 (although, the UK’s NFFO, which also sought 
to deploy renewable electricity capacity, preceded these obligations by over a 
decade). By encouraging the deployment of renewable heating technologies in a 
manner similar to the FiT for electricity generation (generation tariff), the 
 (domestic) Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) was the first of its kind in the world 
when introduced in 2011, and also seeks to contribute to the UK’s obligations 
under the Renewable Energy Directive16. The RHI remains a unique instance in 
the EU of incentivising the deployment of renewable heating in such a direct 
manner. 
 
The remaining instrument in the strategic investment pillar of policy is the Zero 
Carbon Homes (ZCH) requirement, through which new residential properties 
needed from 2016 to achieve zero net CO2 emissions through a combination of 
an increase in regulated energy efficiency requirements, on-site renewable 
electricity generation (for example, through rooftop solar PV) and off-site 
‘allowable solutions’ to offset remaining CO2 emissions. The instrument was 
intended to align with the EU’s NZEB requirements (described in the previous 
section). However it was cancelled in 2015 (one year before it was due to come 
into force). It is now unclear how the UK intends to comply with NZEB 
requirements (although MEPS remain as part of the UK’s building regulations 
(Part L), satisfying current EPBD requirements). Also, as with the EU-level policy 
mix, instruments to tackle energy consumption in existing buildings in the 
strategic investment pillar of policy are lacking.  
 
The second key strength of the UK’s policy mix, as at the EU level (and deriving 
directly from it), is a comprehensive standards & engagement pillar of policy. 
This includes both instruments that seek to achieve the UK’s compliance with EU 
obligations, and those that apply equally across the EU. The Ecodesign and 
Energy Labelling Directives are the key examples of the latter. Regarding the 
 former, the key instruments are the subsequent supplier obligations – the 
successive EESoP, EEC, CERT/CESP and ECO (see Table 2 for spelled-out 
versions of these acronyms). As mentioned above, the use of such instruments in 
the UK significantly preceded EU requirements (the EED was introduced in 2012, 
whilst the EESoP was adopted in 1994). The final key instrument in the 
standards & engagement pillar of policy is the Green Deal, discussed below.. 
 
Key Weaknesses 
 
The UK’s policy mix contains three key weaknesses., The first, as at the EU level, 
is the effectiveness of the instruments under the standards & engagement pillar. 
For new buildings, Pan & Garmston (2012) found that of a sample taken of 
residential properties built between 2006 and 2009 in the UK, only a third were 
in compliance with MEPS for new-build properties. Indeed, awareness of 
regulations for existing buildings is very low, even among the construction 
industry (CLG, 2006). 
 
For supplier obligations designed to tackle energy consumption and CO2 
emissions from existing buildings, a  ‘delivery gap’ between reported and actual 
impact may be identified. Under these instruments, energy suppliers were 
assigned energy or CO2 saving targets to be achieved over defined periods - the 
majority of which were officially achieved or even over-achieved (as illustrated 
in Table 2). However, doubts have been expressed as to whether the imputed 
energy and CO2 savings from the installed measures have been achieved in 
practice. The evaluation of the performance of such instruments is usually based 
 on engineering and modelled estimates of how the installed technology will 
perform, rather than actual measured savings – an approach that routinely 
overestimates actual outcomes (Rosenow & Galvin, 2013). Although the UK 
compares relatively favourably with other EU Member States (such as Germany) 
in considering in some calculated evaluations (for example, in the evaluations of 
Efficiency Commitment by Lees (2006 and 2008)) phenomena that produce such 
discrepancies between calculated and measured results, such as rebound effects, 
‘prebound effects’ (coined by Sunikka-Blank and Galvin (2012), and referring to 
a situation in which energy consumption prior to the introduction of a policy 
instrument is overestimated), technical shortcomings in installed measures, and 
deadweight losses (from householders that would have taken the action 
encouraged by the policy regardless of the instrument’s existence) (Rosenow & 
Galvin, 2013), the evidence suggests that some discrepancy between actual and 
calculated savings, as used to demonstrate compliance, remains. 
 
The current supplier obligation incarnation, the ECO, has thus far resulted in a 
sharp reduction in the number of energy efficiency measures installed compared 
to previous instruments (particularly CERT/CESP). This stems from a re-
orientation towards more expensive measures such as solid wall and hard-to-
treat cavity wall insulation, and an increase in the paperwork required for the 
approval of these measures. This has made it more difficult to include the new 
approach in existing business models. Additionally, the financial contribution 
required by consumers has also increased. It is estimated that in 2014, the 
combined ECO/Green Deal package delivered measures that will produce 74% 
less energy and 86% less CO2 lifetime savings than those installed annually on 
 average between 2008 and 2012 under the previous CERT/CESP instrument 
package (Rosenow & Eyre, 2015).  
 
Although introduced as part of a policy package with the ECO, the Green Deal 
was not introduced in (direct) response to EU requirements, but in addition to 
them. As described in Table 2, the instrument was effectively discontinued in 
2015. The Green Deal contained a number of innovative elements (for the UK), to 
encourage householders themselves to invest in regulated energy efficiency 
measures. Principal among these was the availability of a loan for pre-approved 
regulated energy efficiency measures attached to the property rather than the 
householder (and thus liable for repayment by successive occupiers), with 
monthly repayments made via electricity bills at a level designed to be equal to 
or lower than the value of energy cost savings as they accrued (the ‘Golden 
Rule’). This was intended to overcome barriers associated with capital costs, the 
landlord-tenant dilemma, and uncertain returns on investment (if, for example, a 
householder were to leave before their return on investment had been 
achieved). 
 
However, the instrument significantly underperformed against expectations, 
with only 626 householders taking part by the end of 2013, against an expected 
figure of 10,000. Rates of uptake did increase, but remained well below 
expectations. Several factors likely contributed to this, including initial problems 
with the IT administration system and the late availability of the loan facility 
(introduced five months after the launch of the instrument itself), but 
particularly the interest rate of the loan, which survey evidence suggested that, 
 at around 7.5%, was considered too high by householders (Rosenow & Eyre, 
2015). Other issues included uncertainty surrounding the long-term financial 
benefits of undertaking regulated energy efficiency measures (Petitfor, Wilson 
and Chryssochoidis, 2015), and a possible perception that with the loan attached 
to the property, with subsequent occupiers liable for repayment, the sale value of 
the property would be reduced (Ashworth & Perera, 2015). When in June 2014 
capital grants (the Green Deal Home Improvement Fund) were introduced with 
the intention to stimulate uptake of Green Deal finance, they were very quickly 
oversubscribed, with the second tranche of funding allocated within a single day, 
but it seems that many householders simply accepted the grant with little or no 
intention of supplementing this with a Green Deal finance package, as per the 
intended function (Rosenow & Eyre, 2015).  
 
The second key weakness of the UK’s policy mix, again aligned to the EU-level 
mix, is the paucity in coverage of markets & pricing instruments. The CCL and 
CFP/CSP (see Table 2 for spelled-out acronyms) are the UK’s main energy and 
carbon pricing instruments (alongside the EU ETS, applied at the EU level). 
Whilst the former only applies directly to the energy consumption of (all except 
the smallest) firms, the associated costs feed through to goods purchased by the 
residential sector. The latter, as described in Table 2, attempts to provide a UK-
specific carbon floor price, on top of the EU ETS, which feeds through into the 
price of electricity. However, CO2 emissions from remaining sources of energy in 
the residential sector (75% of energy consumption in 2014) remain unpriced12. 
The CFP rate was initially intended to increase to £30/tCO2 by 2020, and to 
£70/tCO2 by 2030, but, due to the low EU ETS permit price and concerns about 
 the CSP’s impacts on the competitiveness of UK industry, the CSP is currently 
frozen at £18/tCO2 until 2020. 
 
In addition, as permitted by the EU’s VAT and Energy Directives, the UK levies a 
reduced-rate (5%) VAT on residential energy consumption (the standard VAT 
rate is 20%). The implicit annual subsidy to households that this represents is 
approximately £5bn (Advani et al., 2013), although less than 30% of the implicit 
subsidy is taken households in the bottom three income deciles (Preston et al., 
2013). Residential energy prices in the UK currently exhibit the lowest tax and 
levies component in the EU (EUROSTAT, 2016). However, this is offset to some 
extent by on-bill levies from other climate and energy policy mechanisms (e.g. 
FiTs and RO/CfDs). 
 
The third key weakness, common to all three pillars of policy, is a lack of stability 
and long-term credibility in the policy instrument landscape in the UK. Since its 
election in May 2015, the new UK Government has removed or significantly 
amended several low-carbon energy instruments with little or no notice or 
indication of replacements where required the UK’s statutory carbon and energy 
targets. Regarding the promotion of low-carbon electricity, this includes removal 
of support for onshore wind and termination of its eligibility for the RO one year 
early, and an abrupt 65% reduction in the FiT (generation tariff) for small-scale 
(household) solar PV (<4kW) applicable from 1st January 2016. The Green Deal 
and ZCH were also both discontinued at short notice17, with no replacement 
instruments yet proposed, reducing focus on regulated energy efficiency in both 
 new and existing residential properties. A number of other changes which fall 
outside the scope of this paper were also instituted. 
 
The key reason behind such changes was the perceived high cost of these 
instruments18. Regardless of the evidence for and against the assertion of high 
costs, the institution of such abrupt interventions, and a lack of a forthcoming 
strategy with which to replace the functions of such instruments where required, 
has produced numerous accusations of substantially undermining investor 
confidence in the low-carbon sector in the future (e.g. Cuff, 2015; Gross & 
Watson, 2015; Grubb et al, 2015). 
 
Suggested Priority Reforms 
 
As indicated above, many of the key weaknesses in the UK’s policy landscape 
mirror those at the EU level. As such, the suggestions for priority reform that 
may be derived to increase the effectiveness of these instruments are of a similar 
nature. Six such reforms are here proposed: 
 
- Improve enforcement of MEPS for new buildings. Low enforcement (and 
awareness) of these requirements is a key issue in the standards & 
engagement pillar of policy. Such action would further lay the foundation for 
increased ambition, as discussed below. 
- Introduce an instrument to replace the function of the Green Deal. The 
original instrument was subject to various design flaws and other barriers to 
uptake, as described above. However lessons learned may be applied in order 
 to introduce an improved instrument to fulfil the function as originally 
intended (see e.g.. Rosenow & Eyre, 2015). Such a reform may also improve 
the functioning of the ECO (e.g. if householders were to receive a loan to 
finance their contribution to a measure particularly funded by ECO – 
currently a key barrier, as described above). This, along with the reform 
above, may substantially strengthen the standards & engagement pillar of 
policy at the UK level. 
- As at the EU level, the markets & pricing pillar of policy should be extended 
and strengthened. This may be achieved by three key actions. The first is to 
extended carbon pricing to heating fuels, to broaden carbon pricing from 
30% of residential energy consumption (electricity) in the UK, to 80% of 
energy consumption (if a carbon price were applied just to natural gas for 
heating purposes)11 . 
- The second action to strengthen the markets & pricing pillar of policy is 
gradually to increase the reduced-rate of VAT on domestic energy 
consumption (e.g. by 1% per year), to reduce and eventually remove the 
implicit energy consumption subsidy this produces. Although undoubtedly 
politically challenging, governments, including that of the UK, repeatedly 
affirm their determination to remove environmentally perverse subsidies19, 
and this is the largest such subsidy in the UK. Analysis suggests that the 
reform could be implemented with progressive (rather than regressive) 
consequences, through, for example, appropriate recycling of increased VAT 
revenue (Preston et al., 2013). 
- The third action to strengthen the markets & pricing pillar of policy action is 
to restore the original trajectory of the CFP (to reach £30/tCO2 in 2020 and 
 £70/tCO2 in 2030). This would strengthen the carbon price on the electricity 
sector, but this action seems unlikely in the absence of any strengthening of 
the EU ETS permit price component of the CFP.  
- Introduce an instrument to replace the function of the ZCH instrument, to 
restore coverage of energy efficiency in (and direct CO2 emissions from) new 
residential properties under the strategic investment pillar of policy. This 
would also seek to satisfy NZEB requirements. 
 
As many of these suggested reforms align with those at the EU level, it may be 
noted that reform of the policy mix at the EU level may feed through to the UK 
level (e.g. removal of the ability to levy reduced-rate VAT on residential energy 
consumption, or EU-level expansion of carbon pricing). However, there currently 
seems to be little political appetite for such EU-wide reforms (as was seen, for 
example, with the rejection of a revised Energy Taxation Directive proposed in 
2011). Other actions may only be instituted at the national level, such as proper 
enforcement of building regulations (although such action may be encouraged at 
the EU level, through infringement proceedings), and the avoidance of abrupt 
interventions into the policy landscape, with unclear intentions into the medium- 
and long-term.  
 
Conclusion 
 
CO2 emissions from the residential sector make a significant contribution to 
overall GHG emissions in the EU and constituent Member States, and must be 
substantially reduced if the projected decarbonisation of the EU is to be 
 achieved. This paper has explored the policies that are currently in place to 
achieve this reduction, using the policy framework suggested by Grubb et al. 
(2014), which groups instruments into three ‘pillars of policy’; standards & 
engagement; markets & pricing; and strategic investment. 
 
This paper first maps the policy landscape for energy use by residential sector in 
terms of this framework at both the EU level and in an illustrative Member State, 
the UK. It then identifies the key strengths and weaknesses of each revealed 
policy mix according to the scope of energy consumption and associated CO2 
emissions tackled, and the effectiveness of the collection of instruments in each 
pillar in achieving their objectives.  
 
The key strengths and weaknesses of the policy mix at both the EU and UK levels 
are heavily aligned, as may be broadly expected, given the UK obligations under 
the EU landscape. Both policy landscapes exhibit a rich policy mix under the 
standards & engagement pillar of policy, with various instruments designed to 
tackle (both regulated and non-regulated) energy consumption and CO2 
emissions from both new and existing buildings (with some introduced directly 
at the EU level without Member State-specific implementation required, such as 
the Ecodesign and Energy Labelling Directives). This is the first key strength of 
each policy mix (and the only key strength identified at the EU level). Until 
recently the UK went beyond EU requirements, with the ‘Green Deal’ seeking to 
encourage private investment for improving regulated energy efficiency in 
existing buildings in addition to mandated supplier obligations. However, this 
instrument was effectively discontinued in 2015. 
  
The second key strength of the UK’s policy mix was (until recently) a relatively 
comprehensive strategic investment instrument mix, with effective renewable 
electricity and renewable heating support mechanisms, and until mid-2015, an 
instrument to promote net-zero carbon new residential buildings from 2016 
(Zero Carbon Homes). By contrast, the strategic investment pillar is a key 
weakness at the EU level, with ‘nearly-zero’ energy requirements for new 
buildings (with low ambition in implementation by most Member States), no 
requirement for the promotion of renewable heating, and no instrument to 
tackle energy consumption in existing buildings from this perspective (an issue 
shared with the UK). 
 
The two remaining key weaknesses across both policy landscapes are low 
effectiveness of the instruments under the standards & engagement pillar 
(despite broad coverage), and low coverage and effectiveness of instruments 
under the markets & pricing pillar. The first stems from low quality or under-
implementation of instruments at Member State level, poor enforcement, and 
ineffective instrument design. The second stems primarily from a lack of carbon 
pricing on non-electricity energy products for residential consumption, and the 
ability to effectively subsidise residential energy consumption through reduced-
rate VAT (as implemented in the UK). In addition, the UK has recently 
experienced significant abrupt alterations to the policy landscape, with no clear 
long-term strategy to replace the intended functions of instruments that have 
been removed, with possible impacts on investor confidence. 
 
 A range of priority reforms may be instituted to address the weaknesses 
identified at both the EU and UK levels. Such reforms common to both levels of 
governance include improved enforcement of regulatory requirements 
(particularly MEPS for new buildings), the expansion of carbon pricing to heating 
fuels coupled with the removal of reduced-rate VAT for residential energy 
consumption (and the implicit subsidy it entails), and reform of the strategic 
investment pillar to require net-zero energy new buildings and a post-2020 
commitment for supplier obligations to tackle energy consumption in existing 
buildings. Such reforms may be introduced at the EU level for subsequent 
application to all Member States (including the UK), or may be introduced at the 
UK level only. Additional reforms, such as the redesign of key ‘engagement’ 
instruments, along with the requirement (or direct encouragement) for Member 
States to introduce renewable heat support mechanisms in the EU policy mix, 
and the introduction of a mechanism to replace the Green Deal at the UK level, 
may also be identified as priority actions. 
 
It is clear that all these reforms would require considerable political will that is 
currently lacking, and is unlikely to be forthcoming in the short term, especially 
as both the EU and UK seem to be on track to meet or exceed their economy-
wide emission reduction targets for 2020 (EEA, 2015b). However, the EEA 
(2015b) project that economy-wide EU GHG emissions are likely to reach just 
27% below 1990 levels by 2030 under existing measures (and 30% under 
‘planned measures’), falling far short of the 40% target. This places the 2050 
target of 80% in significant doubt.   As such, it is imperative that new policies for 
reducing residential energy use and associated CO2 emissions are introduced, or 
 the existing policy mix implemented more effectively, or both, in order to achieve 
the emissions trajectory for the sector illustrated in Figure 1, and in turn 
contribute to long-term economy-wide objectives that are at present on track to 
be missed. By identifying the scale of the challenge, and examining the strengths 
and weaknesses of the present policy landscapes at both the EU level and in a 
key Member State, this paper hopes to make some contribution to that outcome.  
 References 
 
Advani, A., Bassi, S., Bowen, A., Fankhauser, S., Johnson, P., Leicester, A., Stoye, G. 
(2013) Energy Use Policies and Carbon Pricing in the UK, London, The Institute 
for Fiscal Studies 
 
Allocott, H. and Greenstone, M. (2012) Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap?, 
Working Paper 17766, NBER Working Paper Series, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Ashworth, A. and Perera, S. (2015) Cost Studies of Buildings, 6th Ed., Abingdon, 
Routledge 
 
BPIE (2015) Nearly-Zero Energy Buildings: Definitions Across Europe – Factsheet, 
[Online] Available at: 
http://bpie.eu/uploads/lib/document/attachment/132/BPIE_factsheet_nZEB_d
efinitions_across_Europe.pdf [Accessed 3rd August 2015] 
 
CLG (2006) Review of the Implementation of Part L 2006, London, Department of 
Communities and Local Government 
 
Cohen, R and Bordass, B. (2015) Mandating Transparency about Building Energy 
Performance in Use, Building Research and Information, 43(4), 534-552 
 
 Cuff, M. (2015) UK investors urge government to back renewable energy 
investment’, Business Green, September 11, 
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2425520/uk-investors-urge-
government-to-back-renewable-energy-investment [Accessed 6th January 2016] 
 
DECC (2015a) Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2015: Chapter 6, [Online] Available 
at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/450298/DUKES_2015_Chapter_6.pdf [Accessed 29th December 2015] 
 
DECC (2015b) Levy Control Framework Cost Controls, [Online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/levy-control-framework-cost-
controls [Accessed 7th January 2016] 
 
DECC (2010) The Green Deal: a Summary of the Government’s Proposals, [Online] 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/47978/1010-green-deal-summary-proposals.pdf [Accessed 29th December 
2015] 
 
DG Energy (2012) European Commission Directorate-General for Energy. 
Consultation Paper: Financial support for energy efficiency in buildings. European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, Brussels 
 
EC (2011) Energy Roadmap 2050 – Impact Assessment, SEC (2011) 1565 
 EC (2014) Energy Prices and Costs Report, SWD(2014) 20 final/2 
EC (2015) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Setting a Framework for Energy Efficiency Labelling and Repealing 
Directive 2010/30/EU, COM(2015) 341 final 
 
Ecofys (2012) Towards Nearly Zero-Energy Buildings: Definition of Common 
Principles under the EPBD: Final Report, Germany, Ecofys 
 
Ecofys (2014b) First Findings and Recommendations: Evaluation of the Energy 
Labelling Directive and Specific Aspects of the Ecodesign Directive, Utrecht, Ecofys 
 
Ecofys (2014a) Overview of Member States Information on NZEBs: Working 
Version of the Progress Report – Final Report, Ecofys, Germany 
Economidou, M., Atanasiu, B., Despret, C., & Maio, J., Nolte, I., Rapf, O. (2011) 
Europe’s Buildings Under the Microscope -  A Country by Country Review of the 
Energy Performance of Buildings, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.bpie.eu/uploads/lib/document/attachment/20/HR_EU_B_under_m
icroscope_study.pdf [Accessed 28th July 2015] 
EEA (2015a) EEA Greenhouse Gas – Data Viewer, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/greenhouse-
gases-viewer [Accessed 26th July 2015] 
 
 EEA (2015b) Trends and Projections in Europe 2015 – Tracking Progress Towards 
Europe’s Energy and Climate Targets, EEA Report No. 4/2015, European 
Environment Agency, Copenhagen 
 
EUROSTAT (2016) Energy Price Statistics, [Online] Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_price_statistics [Accessed 6th January 2016] 
 
Gillingham, K. and Palmer, K. (2013) Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Insights 
for Policy from Economic Theory and Empirical Analysis, Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper 13-02 
 
Gross, R. and Watson, J. (2015) UKERC Blog: Restoring Investor Confidence for 
Low Carbon Power, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/news/restoring-investor-confidence-for-low-carbon-
power-a-blog-by-ukerc-co-director-rob-gross.html [Accessed 6th January 2016] 
 
Grubb, M., Hamilton, I., Mallaburn, P., Ekins, P., McDowall, W., Smith, A.Z.P. 
(2015) UK Energy Policy: Politicisation or Rationalisation?, UCL Institute for 
Sustainable Resources Research Report, UCL, London 
 
Grubb, M., Hourcade, J-C., Neuhoff, K. (2014) Planetary Economics: The Three 
Domains of Sustainable Development, Abingdon, Routledge 
 
 Gynther, L., Lapillonne, B., Pollier, K. (2015) Energy Efficiency Trends and Policies 
in the Household and Tertiary Sectors: An Analysis Based on the ODYSSEE and 
MURE Databases, [Online} Avialable at: http://www.odyssee-
mure.eu/publications/br/energy-efficiency-trends-policies-buildings.pdf 
[Accessed 3rd August 2015] 
 
Heinzle, S. L., and Wüstenhagen, R. (2012) Dynamic Adjustment of Eco-labeling 
Schemes and Consumer Choice - the Revision of the EU Energy Label as a Missed 
Opportunity? Business Strategy and the Environment, 21(1), 60–70 
 
Hirst, E and Brown, M. (1990) Closing the Energy Efficiency Gap: Barriers to the 
Efficient Use of Energy, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 3, 267-281 
 
HM Treasury (2015) Fixing the Foundations: Creating a More Prosperous Nation, 
HM Treasury, London 
 
HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs (2010) Carbon price floor: support 
and certainty for low-carbon investment, [Online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/81273/consult_carbon_price_support_condoc.pdf [Accessed 29th December 
2015] 
 
IEA (2012) Energy Technology Perspectives 2012: Pathways to a Clean Energy 
System, Paris, IEA/OECD 
 
 Ipsos Mori, CAG Consultants, UCL and Energy Saving Trust (2014) Evaluation of 
the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target and Community Energy Saving 
Programme: Report for DECC, [Online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/350722/CERT_CESP_Evaluation_FINAL_Report.pdf [Accessed 29th December 
2015] 
Jaffe, A.B. and Stavins, R.N. (1994) The Energy-Efficiency Gap: What Does it Mean?, 
Energy Policy, 22(10), 804-810 
Jordan, A., Wurzel, R. & Zito, A. (Eds.), 2003, ‘New’ Instruments of Environmental 
Governance?: National Experiences and Prospects, Frank Cass, London 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (1982) Judgement under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Laibson, D. (1997) Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, Quaterly Journal of 
Economics, 112 (2), 443-478Lees, E. (2006) Evaluation of the Energy Efficiency 
Commitment 2002-2005, Eoin Lees Energy, Wantage 
Lees, E. (2008) Evaluation of the Energy Efficiency Commitment 2005-2008, Eoin Lees 
Energy, Wantage 
Lipsey, R.G. and Lancaster, K. (1956) General Theory of Second Best, Review of 
Economic Studies, 24(1), 11-32  
 London Economics, & Ipsos (2014) Study on the impact of the energy label – and 
potential changes to it – on consumer understanding and on purchase decisions (No. 
ENER/C3/2013-428 FINAL REPORT). London. 
Martin, R., de Preux, l. and Wagner, U (2011) The Impacts of the Climate Change Levy 
on Manufacturing: Evidence from Microdata, Working Paper 17446 National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
Morewedge, C.K., Holtzman, L., Eplley, N. (2007) Unfixed Resources: Perceived Costs, 
Consumption and the Accessible Account Effect, Journal of Consumer Research, 34 
(4), 459-467 
NAO (2007) The Climate Change Levy and Climate Change Agreements, {Online] 
Available at: http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/climate_change_review.pdf [Accessed 29th December 
2015] 
Norgaard, R.2010 ‘A Coevolutionary Interpretation of Ecological Civilization’, 
available at http://neweconomy.net/webfm_send/23  
OECD (2007) Instrument Mixes for Environmental Policy, OECD, Paris  
OECD (2008) “An OECD Framework for Effective and Efficient Environmental 
Policies”, Meeting of the Environment Policy Committee (EPOC) at Ministerial Level, 
28-29 April 2008, OECD, Paris  
 Ofgem (2015a) ECO Compliance Update to April 2015, [Online] Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2015/04/eco_compliance_updat
e_april_2015__0.pdf [Accessed 29th December 2015] 
Ofgem (2015b) Tariff Tables, [Online] Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/feed-tariff-fit-
scheme/tariff-tables [Accessed 29th December 2015] 
Ofgem (2014a) Non-Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), [Online] Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2014/10/drhi_1st_10000.pdf 
[Accessed 29th December] 
Ofgem (2014b) Non-Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), [Online] Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2014/12/rhi_1gw_milestone_0.
pdf [Accessed 29th December 2015] 
Ofgem (2012) Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) 2012 - 2015: Guidance for 
Suppliers, [Online] Available at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/75771/eco-guidance-consultation-23-november-2012-pdf [Accessed 
29th December 2015] 
Ofgem and Energy Saving Trust (2003) A review of the Energy Efficiency Standards of 
Performance 1994 – 2002, [Online] Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2003/07/4211-
eesop_report_july03.pdf [Accessed 29th December 2015] 
Pan, W. and Garmston, H. (2012) Compliance with Building Energy Regulations for 
 New-Build Dwellings, Energy, 48(1), 11-12 
 
Petitfor,H., Wilson, C. and Chryssochoidis, G. (2015) The Appeal of the Green Deal: 
Empirical Evidence for the Influence of Energy Efficiency Policy on Rennovating 
Homeowners, Energy Policy, 79, 161-176 
 
Preston I., White, V., Browne, J., Dresner, S., Ekins, P., Hamilton, I. (2013) Designing 
Carbon Taxation to Protect Low-Income Households, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
York 
 
Rennings, K. (2000) Redefining Innovation – Eco-innovation research and the 
Contribution from Ecological Economics, Ecological Economics, 32(2), 319-332 
 
Rosenow, J. (2012) Energy Savings Obligations in the UK – a History of Change, 
Energy Policy, 49, 373–382 
 
Rosenow, J. and Eyre, N. (2015) Re-energising the UK’s approach to domestic 
energy efficiency, ECEEE Summer Study Proceedings (1-6 June 2015), Club Belambra 
Les Criques, Presqu’île de Giens Toulon/Hyères, France. 
 
Rosenow, J., Forster, D., Kampman, B., Leguijt, C., Pato, Z., Kaar, A-L., Eyre, N. (2015) 
Study Evaluating the National Policy Measures and Methodologies to Implement 
Article 7 of the Energy Efficiency Directive, Didcot, Ricardo-AEA 
 
 Rosenow, J. and Galvin, R. (2013) Evaluating the Evaluations: Evidence from Energy 
Efficiency Programmes in Germany and the UK, Energy and Buildings, 62, 450-458 
 
Rutherford, M. (1983) John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 17 (3), 721-744 
 
Simon, H.A. (1956) Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 
Psychological Review, 63 (2), 129-138 
 
Sunikka-Blank, M. and Galvin, R. (2012) Introducing the Prebound Effect: 
Relationships between Energy Performance Rating and Actual Heating Energy 
Consumption in German Dwellings, and their Policy Implications, Building Research 
and Information, 40(3), 260-273 
 
Stern, N. (2006) Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, London, HM 
Treasury 
 
Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth and Happiness, Newhaven CT, Yale University Press 
 
Tovey, K. (n.d) University of East Anglia, Carbon Reduction (CRed) project 
presentation at 
www.uea.ac.uk/~e680/energy/Old_modules/env2e02/powerpoint/env-
2e02_section5.ppt 
  
Waide, P. and Watson, R. (2013) Energy Labelling: The New European Energy Label: 
Assessing Consumer Comprehension an Effectiveness as a Market Transformation 
Tool, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.clasponline.org/Resources/Resources/StandardsLabelingResourceLibrar
y/2013/~/ media/Files/SLDocuments/2013/2013_05_EU-Energy-Labelling-
Comprehension-Study.pdf 
 
Wesselink, B., Harmsen, R., Eichhammer, W. (2010) Energy Savings 2020: How to 
Triple the Impact of Energy Saving Policies in Europe, European Climate Foundation 
 
Wurzel, R., Zito, A.R. and Jordan, A.J. (2013) Environmental Governance in Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Use of New Environmental Policy Instruments, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
 
                                                        
1 Much of the research reported here was carried out in the context of the EU FP7 project 
CECILIA2050 (see http://cecilia2050.eu/) over 2013-14. However, for this paper the research 
has been up to date. 
2 Data for 2011 and 2012 illustrate annual CO2 reductions of 16% and -4% (an increase), 
respectively on the previous year (an average annual reduction of 6%) (EEA, 2015a). Data for 
2013 onwards is not yet available, and thus the presence of a long-term trend cannot be 
discerned (particularly due to the substantial variability seen between these two years). 
3 Although this target is economy-wide, EU ETS and transport sectors may be excluded. Other 
instruments such as CO2 taxation, training and information campaigns or the creation of an 
‘Energy Efficiency National Fund’ may also be used to secure compliance if equivalent energy 
savings are produced. The remaining 11 Member States intend to use such mechanisms alone to 
secure compliance. 
4 ‘A  ‘minor’ credibility issue is defined as that in which ‘confidence that the policy package as 
notified by the Member State will realise 90% or more of the required target’, whilst a ‘major’ 
credibility issue is defined as that in which the ‘risk that the policy package as notified by the 
Member State will realise less than 90% of the required target either due to insufficient policy 
savings and/ or significant methodological issues’ (Rosenow et al, 2015). The final Member State, 
Portugal, has an existing EEOS instrument in place but has not notified the Commission of their 
intention to use this for Article 7 compliance, and thus instrument credibility was not assessed by 
this study. 
                                                                                                                                                               
5 Member States are not required to set minimum standards which are not cost-effective over the 
economic lifecycle of the building elements concerned, as determined using the comparative 
methodology framework described in Article 5 and Annex III of the Directive. 
6 Data for 2013 and the EU28, obtained from Eurostat. 
7 Data Source: http://www.res-legal.eu/compare-support-schemes/ 
8 DG Energy (20112) estimate that 75% of the EU’s building stock standing in 2005 will remain 
present in 2050. 
9 This date has been chosen because it was the year of the signature of the Kyoto Protocol, which 
set statutory GHG emission reduction targets on industrial countries for the first time, and it was 
the year of the election of a Labour Government, which introduced many of the instruments to be 
discussed. 
10 Data sources: UK Office of National Statistics and Energy Consumption in the UK (domestic 
data tables). 
11 Data Source: Energy Consumption in the UK (ECUK) Statistics, Table 3.35 
12 Data for 2013, from DUKES, Chapter 3 (domestic data tables). 
13 DEFRA GHG conversion factors 
14 Direct CO2 emissions from the UK residential sector were 74 mtCO2 in 2012, and 94 mtCO2 in 
Germany. In proportional terms, these emissions account for 15.4% of the UK’s total CO2 
emissions in that year, exceeded only by Belgium (16.4%), Ireland and Hungary (both 15.9%) 
(EEA, 2015a).  
15 Data Sources: DUKES and DECC Statistics 
16 The UK must achieve 15% of its gross final energy consumption from renewables by 2020 
(from electricity, heating, cooling and transport), Under the 2001 Renewable Energy Directive., 
the UK was required to produce 10% of gross electricity generation from renewable sources. 
17 The ZCH instrument had been in place since 2006, for compliance to be achieved by 2016. The 
instrument was cancelled in mid-2015. 
18 The cost of renewable support mechanisms is projected by government to rise to £9.1 billion 
per year by 2020 – £1.5 billion above the limit set by the Levy Control Framework (DECC, 
2015b), whilst the ZCH was removed to ‘reduce net regulation on housebuilders’, (HM Treasury, 
2015), in order to encourage increased building rates. 
19 See, for example, the Leaders’ Declaration from the 2015 G7 Summit at Schloss Elmau, which 
stated explicitly: “We remain committed to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies …” 
(https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2015/06_en/g7-gipfel-
dokumente_en.html)  
